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THE HUSBAND-WIFE PRIVILEGES IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
LESTER B. ORFIELD*
I. THE COMMON-LAw INCOMPETENCY
Until 1933 a spouse could not testify in favor of the other spouse
in federal criminal cases.1 Earlier decisions rested on a theory of
public policy alone.2 In 1887 a district court stated: "There can be
no doubt that at common law a wife is not a competent witness for or
against her husband. And this is so not on account of interest, but on
the ground of public policy. . . . There exists no statute of the
United States removing the disability."3 But the court refused to
grant a new trial where the Government called the defendant's wife as
a witness and her testimony was all favorable to the defendant. A later
lower court decision held that the wife cannot testify for the husband
chiefly because of the "presumed identity of interest."4 In 1920 the
Supreme Court followed the latter view.5 But the theory of interest
does not adequately explain the law.6 And the reasons for disqualifica-
tion by interest in general have by this time been universally repu-
diated. As to public policy, it seems strange to hold that where the wife
was the only witness who could show the innocence of her husband
when he is charged with a serious offense, she cannot testify.
7
Various acts of Congress did not change the rule. The federal
statute' adopting existing state law in determining the competency of
witnesses applied only to civil actions, so that the early state law
applied in criminal cases.9 The Supreme Court so held in a case in-
volving testimony by a wife for her husband in 1920.0
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1 This was on the theory that the rules of evidence in 1789 or at the date of
admission of the state applied to rules of evidence including competency of a spouse.
At those dates the wife was incompetent in virtually all states.
2 Lucas v. Brooks, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 436, 452 (1873).
3 United States v. Jones, 32 Fed. 569, 570 (D.S.C. 1887).
4 Knoell v. United States, 239 Fed. 16, 23 (3d Cir. 1917), error dismissed, 246 U.S.
648 (1918).
5 Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 195 (1920).
6 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 601 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as Wigmore with
the exception of references to volume 8 which are to the McNaughton Revision of
1961].
7 Tinsley v. United States, 43 F.2d 890, 896 (8th Cir. 1930).
8 Rev. Stat. § 858 (1875); 12 Stat. 588 (1862).
9 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 299 (1891). The 1906 amendment was
similarly interpreted in Maxey v. United States, 207 Fed. 327, 329 (Sth Cir. 1913).
10 Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, supra note 5, at 195.
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In 1873 the Supreme Court held that the Act of Congress of
July 2, 1864,11 providing that there shall be no exclusion of a witness in
civil actions because he is a party to or interested in the issues tried,
does not give capacity to a wife to testify in favor of her husband.
The Court stated: "That it is a rule of the common law, a wife cannot
be received as a witness for or against her husband, except in a suit
between them, or in criminal cases where he is prosecuted for a wrong
done to her, is not controverted." 2 The statute of 18781 permitting
the defendant to testify did not permit the wife to testify. "In the
absence of a statute expressly allowing the wife to testify for her
husband in a criminal action, she is not a competent witness for him.
Neither the removal of the disability of interest nor the allowing of
a defendant to testify in his own behalf in a criminal action makes
the wife a competent witness." 4
In the decade from 1890 to 1900, the Supreme Court commenced
to deal extensively with testimony by spouses for and against each
other. Two of the earlier cases involved testimony against the spouse.
In 1890 the Supreme Court referred favorably to the common-law
rule that a wife may not testify against her husband.' In 1892 the
Supreme Court assumed that the wife was not a competent witness in
the absence of waiver.'6 The next year the Court held in a murder
prosecution that "the wife was not a competent witness either in
behalf of, or against her husband.' 7 It was reversible error for the
United States Attorney to comment on her absence, over objection. She
cannot be placed on the stand. One judge, dissenting, thought that the
wife should be present so that clearer identification of her husband
could be made.'
Lower federal courts followed this view in several decisions? 9
In 1911 the Supreme Court repeated its view that a wife cannot testify
for her husband in a murder case.2" There was no reasoning offered
11 13 Stat. 351 (1864).
12 Lucas v. Brooks, supra note 2, at 452-453. See 2 Wigmore §§ 608, 619.
13 20 Stat. 30 (1878).
14 United States v. Crow Dog, 3 Dak. 106, 14 N.V. 437, 438 (1882). See 2
Wigmore §§ 608, 619. See also United States v. Liddy, 2 F.2d 60 (E.D. Pa. 1924);
Talbott v. United States, 208 Fed. 144 (5th Cir. 1913) as to co-defendants.
15 Bassett v. United States, 137 U.S. 496, 505 (1890).
16 Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 331 (1892).
17 Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893).
is Id. at 122.
19 United States v. Sims, 161 Fed. 1008, 1010 (N.D. Ala. 1907); Wesoky v.
United States, 175 Fed. 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1910).
20 Hendrix v. United States, 219 U.S. 79, 91 (1911).
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and the Court cited a case not involving spouses, holding that state law
applies to the admission of testimony.2'
Occasionally a court excluded a wife's testimony for her husband
even though state law at the date of admission allowed her to testify.22
The common-law rule, without reference to any particular state, ex-
cluding the wife's testimony was applied in some cases.23 Occasionally
the court excluded by looking at current decisions of the state.24
In 1919 a court pointed out that the Supreme Court had recently
concluded that the "dead hand of the common-law rule of 1789 should
no longer be applied" to exclude the testimony of convicted felons.
The lower court also stated: "It may perhaps be said with equal
reason that 'the same dead hand' should no longer disqualify husband
and wife except as respects confidential communications.1 25 If the
trial court had admitted the testimony of a wife for a defendant, the
Court of Appeals would not have readily reversed. But since it had
not, the common-law rule would be followed. But in 1920 the Supreme
Court held that the law of 1789 applied to a criminal prosecution in
Pennsylvania; and the defendant's wife was not competent to testify
for her husband generally or even by contradicting testimony that
certain matters occurred in her presence.26
In 1927 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a wife
could testify for her husband in a narcotics prosecution. The
Supreme Court had held that a person convicted of a felony may
testify irrespective of state law, and the modern trend is to remove
disability of witnesses. The same was held in a liquor prosecution, but
21 Logan v. United States, supra note 9.
22 Adams v. United States, 259 Fed. 214 (8th Cir. 1919); Liberato v. United
States, 13 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1926), corrected in Rendleman v. United States, 18
F.2d 27, 29 (9th Cir. 1927). See Leach, "State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts,"
43 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 565-566 (1930).
23 Adams v. United States, supra note 22. The state was Oklahoma.
24 Slick v. United States, 1 F.2d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 1924). The state was Illinois.
25 Fitter v. United States, 258 Fed. 567, 577 (2d Cir. 1919).
26 jin Fuey Moy v. United States, supra note 5, at 195. The case is criticized in
Leach, supra note 22, at 563-564.
The case was followed in Fisher v. United States, 32 F.2d 602, 604 (4th Cir.
1929); Barton v. United States, 25 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1928); United States v.
Swierzbenski, 18 F.2d 685 (W.D.N.Y. 1927); Liberato v. United States, supra note 22;
Fasulo v. United States, 7 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1925); Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d
688, 693 (7th Cir. 1925), cert. denied sub nom. Mullen v. United States, 267 U.S. 598
(1925); Slick v. United States, supra note 24; Krashowitz v. United States, 282 Fed.
599, 601 (4th Cir. 1922) ; Lowe v. United States, 282 Fed. 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1922).
27 Rendleman v. United States, supra note 22, noted in 22 Ill. L. Rev. 545 (1928);
Bronough, "Competency of Husband or Wife in Criminal Case in Federal Court," 31
Law Notes 108 (1927).
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no reversible error was found in excluding the wife's testimony.2"
But the same court upheld a trial judge in refusing to let the wife
testify where the defendant failed to state what he expected to prove
by her testimony. 9 In 1930 the Eighth Circuit by Judge Kenyon
sharply criticized the rule preventing the wife from testifying for her
husband as "an absurdity and a relic of legal barbarism which should
no longer be recognized."3° However, the case involved testimony of
a wife for a co-defendant. The court referred to an article3' of
Professor W. Barton Leach concluding that in some states statutes
existed at the time of admission qualifying the wife as a witness and
that in such states the wife should be able to testify in a federal
criminal case. In 1931 the Fourth Circuit adhered to the rule of
incompetency.3 2
Occasionally some assistance was given to the defendant spouse.
In some cases the wife of the defendant testified for him apparently
without objection by the Government. 33 The jury should be instructed
on request that the wife cannot testify for her husband where the
facts are such that the jury might otherwise draw unfavorable in-
ferences from her failure to testify.34
Suppose several defendants are jointly indicted and jointly tried.
May the spouse of one defendant testify in favor of another defendant?
An early case held that she could not testify.33 Since the husband
could not be a witness, his wife could not be.36 Even after the law
permitted a defendant to be a witness, it was held in several cases
28 Green v. United States, 19 F.2d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1927), aff'd, 277 U.S. 438
(1928).
29Romeo v. United States, 23 F.2d 551, 552 (9th Cir. 1928), on rehearing, 24
F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1928) ; Hass v. United States, 31 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1929).
30 Tinsley v. United States, supra note 7, at 895. The court cited I Wigmore
§§ 600-601.
31 Leach, supra note 22. (The article was inserted in the Congressional Record of
June 9, 1930.)
32 Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1931), noted 79 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1146 (1931).
33 Lasco v. United States, 287 Fed. 69 (2d Cir. 1923) (drug prosecution); United
States v. Lindsly, 7 F.2d 247, 255 (El). La. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.2d 771
(5th Cir. 1926).
The defendant could waive testimony against him by his spouse. Benson v. United
States, supra note 16, at 331. So it would seem the Government could waive testimony
for the defendant by his spouse.
34 Fisher v. United States, supra note 26, at 604.
35 United States v. Wade, 28 Fed. Cas. 306 (No. 16629) (C.C.D.C. 1826). The
court cited only Rex v. Frederick and Tracy, 2 Strange 1095, 93 Eng. Rep. 1054 (1795).
See 2 Wigmore § 609.
36 United States v. Wade, supra note 35.
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that the wife was not a competent witness for or against co-defendant
at a joint trial.3 7 She could not even be a witness for a co-defendant38
although there were several cases contra. 9 Some cases left the question
open where the wife's testimony could not affect the husband.40
Suppose that several defendants are jointly indicted, but tried
separately. May the wife of one defendant testify for a co-defendant
at his separate trial? Several cases left this question open without
deciding it.41 Some cases allowed her to testify.42
Finally, in 1933, the Supreme Court held by Justice Sutherland
that the disqualification of the wife to testify for her husband was
no longer a part of the common law administered in the federal
courts.43 This was the trend of state legislation.44 The reasons given by
the common law for its rule were not convincing. The Court expressly
left open the question of competency of one spouse to testify against
the other. The common-law reason as to interest was not convincing
because, since 1878, the defendant could testify even though his
interest was much greater. Public policy favoring the maintenance
of harmonious marital relations is fanciful in the light of present day
conditions.
While under the Funk case a wife could testify for her husband,
where the trial court refused to allow her to testify, the Court of
37 Talbott v. United States, supra note 14; United States v. Liddy, supra note 14.
38 Dowdy v. United States, supra note 32, at 420, noted 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 746
(1931) (where wife's testimony would inure to the benefit of her husband); Israel v.
United States, 3 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1925) (where wife's testimony would affect
the husband's defense); Haddad v. United States, 294 Fed. 536 (6th Cir. 1923); Fitter
v. United States, supra note 25, at 576; United States v. Liddy, supra note 14; United
States v. Davidson, 285 Fed. 661, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1922).
39 Tinsley v. United States, supra note 7, at 895; Romeo v. United States, supra
note 29, at 552; Green v. United States, supra note 28, at 852 (not reversible error
to exclude, however). See Wigmore, 15 Ill. L. Rev. 453 (1921).
40 Israel v. United States, supra note 38, at 745.
41 Dowdy v. United States, supra note 32, at 421, noted 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1146
(1931); Israel v. United States, supra note 38, at 745; United States v. Wade, supra
note 35.
42 O'Brien v. United States, 299 Fed. 568, 569 (8th Cir. 1924), citing 4 Wigmore
§§ 2234-2237 (2d ed. 1923); United States v. Addatte, 24 Fed. Cas. 763 (No. 14422)
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1868).
43 Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933), noted 14 B.U.L. Rev. 175 (1934),
19 Cornell L.Q. 480 (1934), 22 Geo. L.J. 626 (1934), 19 Iowa L. Rev 488 (1934),
23 Ky. L.J. 190 (1934), 33 Mich. L. Rev. 306 (1934), 18 Minn. L. Rev. 893 (1934),
13 Ore. L. Rev. 259 (1934), 19 St. Louis L. Rev. 157 (1934), 8 St. John's L.
Rev. 375 (1934), 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 406 (1934).
44 At the present time only twelve states have statutes purporting to make spouses
incompetent to testify for one another. But even in such states the rule is much less
rigid than at common law. See Note, 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 208, 209 (1961).
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Appeals would not reverse in the absence of an offer of proof in the
record showing the nature of the testimony.45 Following the Funk
case, the courts repeatedly stated in dictum that a wife could testify
for her husband. There was no problem where she was willing to
testify. But suppose she was not willing. A single case has presented
the problem. Husband and wife had both been convicted of robbery.
The husband moved for a new trial. When called by the husband to
testify on the motion, she stated that she did not want to testify
"against my husband or for him," and assigned as her ground, "On
the wife's privilege." The wife had not yet been sentenced, and the
period allowed for appeal had not expired. It was held that the wife
need not testify, chiefly on the ground of self-incrimination.46
The federal law on competency of a spouse to testify for the
other spouse is now much improved. But the lead was taken by the
states, and the federal courts were slow to follow.
II. THE PRIVILEGE FOR ANTI-MARITAL FACTS
1. History
In 1839 Justice McLean, speaking for the Supreme Court, stated:
"It is, however, admitted in all the cases that the wife is not competent
except in cases of violence upon her person, directly to criminate her
husband, or to disclose that which she has learned from him in their
confidential intercourse."47 In 1893, in a murder prosecution, the
Supreme Court held that a wife was "not a competent witness ...
against her husband. '48 Thus the earlier federal cases are correctly
said to have treated adverse testimony as a matter of competency.49
In 1914 a court stated the rule as follows: "At common law the
husband and wife were each under total disability to testify for the
45 Price v. United States, 68 F.2d 133, 134 (5th Cir. 1934).
46 Mills v. United States, 281 F.2d 736, 739 (4th Cir. 1960); accord, Bisno v.
United States, 299 F.2d 711, 721 (9th Cir. 1961). But. cf. Wyatt v. United States, 362
U.S. 525, 529 (1960), compelling a wife to testify in a Mann Act prosecution where
she is the victim.
For the federal case law on compelling of a spouse to testify for another spouse,
see Annot., 97 L. Ed. 607, 608-610 (1953). See also 2 Wigmore §§ 488, 600-620;
McCormick, Evidence § 66 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCormick].
In England the spouse may give evidence on the application of the defendant, but
may not be compelled to give evidence. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law § 632 (17th ed.
1958).
47 Stein v. Bowman, 38 US. (13 Pet.) 209, 222 (1839). This was repeated in
Bassett v. United States, supra note 15, at 505. See also United States v. Jones, supra
note 3, at 570.
48 Graves v. United States, supra note 17, at 121.
43 Note, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 719, 724 (1950); Note, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 884, 888 (1959).
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other, but the disability did not extend to the testimony of one against
the other. Such testimony of the one against the other was excluded,
however, unless both the husband and wife waived the privilege and
consented to its admission."50
Following Wigmore,5 several modern cases have held that it is
not correct to speak of competency to testify against a spouse, but
rather one should speak of a privilege not to testify. 2 In 1949 the
Supreme Court stated: "The federal courts have held that one spouse
cannot testify against the other unless the defendant waives the
privilege." 3 But several cases continued to treat it as a question of
competency.54 Federal statutes adopting existing state laws as to
competency of witnesses applied only to civil actions. 5' The federal
statute56 providing that there shall be no exclusion of a witness in
civil actions because he is a party to or interested in the issues tried,
did not apply to criminal cases.57 The statute of 18 781s providing
that a defendant may testify and that no witness shall be excluded on
account of color, or because he is a party or interested in the issue
tried, did not affect the competency of one spouse against the other in
a federal criminal case.59
One might have thought that following the Funk case,60 the
federal courts would be willing to take the next step and permit a
spouse to testify against a spouse. But most of the cases have declined
to do so."' The Third Circuit declined to let a husband testify against
his wife and even against a co-defendant. 2 No doctrine of marital har-
50 Cohen v. United States, 214 Fed. 23, 29 (9th Cir. 1914). The court cited 8
Wigmore § 2239.
51 8 Wigmore § 2242.
52 Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 1954); Shores v. United
States, 174 F.2d 838, 839 (8th Cir. 1949) ; United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1008
(2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944).
53 Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 714 (1949). See also Wyatt v. United
States, supra note 46, at 528; Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958).
54 Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 615 (1953); Funk v. United States,
supra note 43, at 373; Brunner v. United States, 168 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948).
55 Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 195 (1920).
56 13 Stat. 351 (1864).
57 Lucas v. Brooks, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 436, 452 (1873).
58 20 Stat. 30 (1878).
59 Johnson v. United States, 221 Fed. 250 (8th Cir. 1915). See also Hendrix v.
United States, supra note 20, at 85; Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, supra note 55, at
195; United States v. Crow Dog, 3 Dak. 106, 14 N.V. 437, 438 (1882).
6o Funk v. United States, supra note 43.
61 McCormick § 66.
62 Paul v. United States, 79 F.2d 561, 563 (3d Cir. 1935). See also United States v.
Gonella, 103 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1939).
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mony could be applied, as the spouses had lived apart for several years.
The Sixth Circuit refused to let a wife testify against her husband in
a prosecution for obtaining a registered letter from a letter carrier by
fraud. 3 The court felt itself bound by a decision of the Supreme
Court.6 4 The Second Circuit refused to allow a wife to testify in a
prosecution for transporting money in interstate commerce which had
been taken feloniously by fraud.65 The opinion was rendered by Learned
Hand, but Judge Charles E. Clark dissented. Judge Hand stated:
"We conclude therefore that we should await the choice of Congress
between the conflicting interests involved, or such an overwhelming
general acceptance by the states of abolition of the privilege as induced
the Supreme Court to action in Funk v. United States."66 The Fifth
Circuit 7 and the Ninth Circuit6 s adhered to the earlier law. In 1949
Justice Frankfurter speaking for the Court stated: "The federal courts
have held that one spouse cannot testify against the other unless the
defendant spouse waives the privilege. Since this Court in the Funk
case left open the question whether this rule should be changed,...
it presumably is still the 'federal rule' for the lower courts.1
69
In 1935 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit indicated by
Judge McDermott that it was ready to accept the view that a spouse
may testify against another spouse.70 The court took this position
although the case could have gone off on the point that the wife
testifying was a divorced wife. In 1952 the Seventh Circuit followed
this case,71 but it was reversed by the Supreme Court.72 In 1957 the
Tenth Circuit adhered to its view73 but was also reversed by the
Supreme Court.74
63 Brunner v. United States, supra note 54, at 283.
64 Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893).
65 United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 567 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
S91 (1949), noted 30 B.U.L. Rev. 135 (1950), 38 Geo. L.J. 316 (1950), 25 Notre Dame
Law. 382 (1950), 23 So. Cal. L. Rev. 405 (1950), 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 525 (1950).
66 United States v. Walker, supra note 65, at 568.
67 Jackson v. United States, 250 F.2d S97, 900 (5th Cir. 1958); Ford v. United
States, 210 F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1954).
68 Olender v. United States, supra note 52, at 800.
69 Griffin v. United States, supra note 53, at 714-715.
70 Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 1935), noted 24 Calif. L.
Rev. 472 (1936), 4 Duke B.A.J. 107 (1936), 35 Mich. L. Rev. 329 (1936), 20 Minn. L.
Rev. 693 (1936), 10 So. Cal. L. Rev. 94 (1936). The case was followed in Thouvenell
v. Zerbst, 83 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1936).
71 United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748, 761 (7th Cir. 1952). The court also
had another basis, invalidity of the marriage.
72 Lutwak v. United States, supra note 54.
73 Hawkins v. United States, 249 F.2d 735, 736 (10th Cir. 1957).
74 Hawkins v. United States, supra note 53.
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In 1943 Judge Charles E. Clark pointed out that New York law
permitted a spouse to testify against a spouse, and that the Model
Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute omitted any privilege,
although the privilege for confidential communications was retained. 75
In 1949 Judge Clark restated his view in a dissenting opinion.70 The
same year a district court permitted a spouse who was the victim of an
offense against property to testify.7 7
In 1953 the Supreme Court stated that: "It is open to us to say
whether we shall go further and abrogate the common law rule dis-
qualifying one spouse from testifying in criminal cases against the
other spouse."17 In 1959 the Court stated its decision in the pending
case "does not foreclose whatever changes in the rule may eventually
be dictated by 'reason and experience.' 1179
A defendant may not attack testimony of a spouse against him as
being a violation of due process of law." Habeas corpus will not lie.8 '
It should be noted that in 1961, in a case involving a state statute
making the defendant incompetent to give sworn testimony in his
own behalf, two Justices of the Supreme Court suggested that such a
statute violated due process.8 2 But obviously the latter problem is
quite different from the present one. Excluding witnesses otherwise
competent is surely not the same as permitting witnesses otherwise
competent to testify.
2. Policy of the Privilege
What is the rationale as to testimony against a spouse? In 1953
Justice Minton, speaking for the Supreme Court, stated: "The reason
for the rule at common law disqualifying the wife is to protect the
75 United States v. Mitchell, supra note 52, at 1008.
76 United States v. Walker, supra note 65, at 569.
Citing this opinion of Judge Clark, the Preliminary Report on Rules of Evidence
for the United States District Courts of February 1962 states at p. 28:
"The reluctance of the Supreme Court to attempt to improve evidence rules by
decisions, is matched by the inability of the lower courts to show progress towards a
modern law of Federal criminal evidence."
77 United States v. Graham, 87 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Mich. 1949), noted 48 Mich. L.
Rev. 1223 (1950).
78 Lutwak v. United States, supra note 54, at 614.
79 Hawkins v. United States, supra note 53, at 79.
80 Wilhoit v. Wyatt, 60 F. Supp. 664, 666 (M.D. Pa. 1945); Alford v. Territory,
205 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir. 1953).
81 In general, habeas corpus does not lie to attack competency of a spouse to
testify before the grand jury and at the trial. Thouvenell v. Zerbst, supra note 70.
82 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 601-602 (1961). See Louisell, "Confidentiality,




sanctity and tranquility of the marital relationship. ' 8 3 In 1959
Justice Black, speaking for the Court stated:
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband
or husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake
was a belief that such a policy is necessary to foster family peace,
not only for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the
benefit of the public as well. Such a belief has never been unreason-
able and is not now.... The widespread success achieved by courts
throughout the country in conciliating family differences is a real in-
dication that some apparently broken homes can be saved provided
no unforgivable act is done by either party. Adverse testimony
given in criminal proceedings would, we think, be likely to destroy
almost any marriage.
Other jurisdictions have been reluctant to do more than
modify the rule. English statutes permit spouses to testify against
each other in prosecutions for only certain types of crimes.
And most American states retain the rule, though many provide
exceptions in some classes of cases. The limited nature of these
exceptions shows there is a widespread belief, grounded on present
conditions, that the law should not force or encourage testimony
which might alienate husband and wife or further inflame existing
domestic differences.8 4
3. Who Is Prohibited as Husband and Wife
The privilege exists only where the parties are lawfully married.
Where there is a sham marriage and no intention to live together as
husband and wife, the Supreme Court has denied the privilege.85
Three Justices dissented because the validity of the marriage was
not decided. The lower court had held that the marriage was invalid,
indulging in the improper presumption that the law of the place where
the marriage was celebrated, here French law, was the same as
American law. 6 The majority of the Supreme Court did not pass
on the point, but the three dissenting Justices disapproved the
unrealistic presumption. s
A statute of 1887 provided that:
in any proceeding or prosecution before a grand jury, a judge,
83 Lutwak v. United States, supra note 54, at 615.
84 Hawkins v. United States, supra note 53, at 77-79. See also 8 Wigmore § 2228.
85 Lutwak v. United States, supra note 54, noted 38 Cornell L.Q. 614 (1953), 41
Geo. L.J. 576 (1953), 37 Marq. L. Rev. 79 (1953), 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1330 (1953), 31
N.C.L. Rev. 520 (1953), 26 So. Cal. L. Rev. 452 (1953), 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 313 (1953),
20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1953), 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 700 (1953), 15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 318
(1954).
See also Pereira v. United States, 202 F.2d 830, 835 (5th Cir. 1953).
86 United States v. Lutwak, supra note 71, at 761.
87 See Schlesinger, Comparative Law 124 (2d ed. 1959); Note, 38 Cornell L.Q.
614, 619 (1953).
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justice, or a United States commissioner, or a court in any prose-
cution for bigamy, polygamy or unlawful cohabitation, under any
statute of the United States, the lawful husband or wife of the
person accused shall be a competent witness, and may be called,
but shall not be compelled to testify in such proceeding, examina-
tion, or prosecution without the consent of the husband or wife, as
the case may be: and such witness shall not be permitted to testify
as to any statement or communication made by either husband or
wife to each other, during the existence of the marriage relation,
deemed confidential at common law.88
In a prosecution for bigamy, the alleged second wife was compelled
to testify against the defendant over his objection. It was held that
her competency depended on whether the marriage to the alleged first
wife was established, and that this was a question to be settled by the
judge. Since there was evidence sufficient to justify the judge in finding
the first marriage valid, there was no error in his ruling.89 In these
cases the preliminary question for the judge coincided with an
ultimate question for the jury." In Miles v. United States,91 the
Supreme Court said that when the first marriage was found by the
judge, the second wife could testify to the second marriage, but not
to the first." Neither wife could testify to the first marriage. The
defendant's admissions may be used to show the first marriage. As
long as the first marriage is contested, the second wife may not testify.
Where the first marriage has by other evidence been duly established
to the satisfaction of the court, the second wife may be admitted to
prove her marriage to the defendant. If the first marriage is lawful,
the first wife may not testify against the defendant.93 But in 1958 the
Supreme Court in a dictum seemed to imply otherwise.9
4. Hearsay Statements of Spouse
A spouse is protected not only as to oral testimony by his spouse,
but also as to her documentary utterances. In an income tax evasion
prosecution, documents filed by the wife with local welfare authorities
88 24 Stat. 635 (1887).
89 Matz v. United States, 158 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1946). The court cited Miles v.
United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1880).
90 See Note, 38 Cornell L.Q. 614, 619 n.34 (1953); Note, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 313
(1953).
91 103 U.S. 304, 313 (1880).
92 Dean Wigmore has pointed out that the cases involving the competency of
spouses in plural marriages are confusing both in reasoning and result. 8 Wigmore
§ 2231.
93 Bassett v. United States, 137 U.S. 496 (1890); United States v. Walker, supra
note 65.
94 Hawkins v. United States, supra note 53, at 78. See 8 Wigmore § 2239.
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introduced to impeach the husband were held to be within the privilege,
but as no objection was made at the trial, they were admitted on a
theory of waiver.5 There can be no claim of privilege where the
defendant's records were turned over by his estranged wife to the
Internal Revenue Service.96 In an income tax evasion prosecution,
Government agents were permitted to testify as to information received
from the defendant's wife, but not her declarations concerning his
guilt. A motion to suppress was denied. 7
When statements are made by the wife in the presence of her
husband under such circumstances that his silence would in effect
admit their truth, the statements may be received in evidence if third
persons are present. In a conspiracy prosecution of a wife, her failure
to deny a statement made by her husband in her presence was
admissible. 8
5. Co-defendants
The wife of one defendant charged with conspiracy, who has
pleaded guilty, can testify against the other defendants over their
objection, where neither she nor her husband claim any privilege.
However, if he had not pleaded guilty, her testimony would be incom-
petent. The reason for the rule, which is to prevent the violation
of confidences between spouses and the incrimination of one by the
other, no longer applies after a plea of guilty.9 The court applied the
law of the state in 1789.
When, in 1933, the Supreme Court changed the rule so that a
wife could testify for her husband, it followed logically that she could
95 Olender v. United States, supra note 52, at 799. See 8 Wigmore § 2232.
o United States v. Ashby, 245 F.2d 684, 686 (5th Cir. 1957). A motion to suppress
was denied.
97 United States v. Winfree, 170 F. Supp. 659, 660 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
98 United States v. Anthony, 145 F. Supp. 323, 335 (M.D. Pa. 1956).
The cases are collected in 80 A.L.R. 1229, 1246 (1932); 115 A.L.R. 1514 (1938);
8 Wigmore § 2232 n.4.
A wife's declarations to a police officer are competent against her husband if what
she said was a step in a venture to which both were parties, but are incompetent if not
made in such a venture regardless of whether a conspiracy was charged. It makes no
difference that the jury later acquitted the wife. United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d
497, 500 (2d Cir. 1945).
19 Knoell v. United States, 239 Fed. 16, 22 (3d Cir. 1917), error dismissed, 246
U.S. 64S (1918). The court cited 4 Wigmore § 2236.
See also Astwood v. United States, 1 F.2d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 1924).
In England, where the spouse of a defendant is not competent to give evidence for
the prosecution, the exclusion applies also to the spouse of a co-defendant unless the
co-defendant would himself be competent. The co-defendant would be competent at a
separate trial. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law § 634 (17th ed. 1958).
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testify for a co-defendant10  But it has been held that a spouse
cannot testify against a co-defendant.' 1 Another court declined to
review the question on habeas corpus. 2
6. Testimony Against Divorced Spouse
A divorced wife may testify against her husband.0 3 In 1954 the
Supreme Court made it clear that divorce ends all bars to spousal
testimony. 0 4 The spouse may testify as to matters occurring before
their marriage, and as to non-confidential communications occurring
during their marriage.'05 There is a different rule as to confidential
marital communications.
When the marriage has been annulled after the offense and before
the trial, a spouse may testify against the other spouse. 106 It makes no
difference whether the annulment rendered the marriage void from
its inception or from the date of entry of the annulment since a divorce
would be equally effective to remove the privilege.
7. Exceptions
In two early cases in the District of Columbia, a wife was per-
mitted to testify that her husband had committed an assault and
battery as to her.107 In 1839 the Supreme Court stated in a civil case:
"It is a general rule that neither a husband nor wife can be a witness
for or against the other. . . .The rule is subject to some exceptions;
as where the husband commits an offense against the person of his
wife."' 08 In 1851 Justice Wayne of the Supreme Court stated in a
civil case:
100 19 Iowa L. Rev. 488 (1934).
101 Paul v. United States, supra note 62. The party-spouse was acquitted at the
joint trial. If she had been previously acquitted, her husband should then have been
permitted to testify. But see 8 Wigmore § 2236 n.2.
1T02 Wilhoit v. Wyatt, supra note 80, at 665.
103 United States v. Termini, 267 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1959); Pool v. United States,
260 F.2d 57, 64 (9th Cir. 1958); Picciurro v. United States, 250 F.2d 585, 589 (8th
Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Ashby, supra note 96, at 686; Dobbins v. United States, 157
F.2d 257, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 734 (1946); Cohen v. United
States, 120 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1941); United States v. Gonella, 103 F.2d 123 (3d Cir.
1939) ; Yoder v. United States, supra note 70, at 668; Jacobs v. United States, 161 Fed.
694, 697 (1st Cir. 1908). See 8 Wigmore § 2237.
104 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954).
105 Ibid. See also Dobbins v. United States, supra note 103.
106 Cooper v. United States, 282 F.2d 527, 533 (9th Cir. 1960).
107 United States v. Fitton, 25 Fed. Cas. 1092 (No. 15106) (C.C.D.C. 1835);
United States v. Smallwood, 27 Fed. Cas. 1131 (No. 16316) (C.C.D.C. 1836). See 8
Wigmore § 2239.
108 Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 221 (1839). This view was accepted
as correct in Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958).
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I know of but three exceptions to the incompetency of a wife to
testify against her husband in a criminal case; they give her ample
security against his abuse. She is a competent witness in an inquiry
against her husband, upon a charge which affects her liberty or
person. Such, for example, as a prosecution for a forcible marriage,
though she may have cohabited with him . . . ; or she may be a
witness for any gross injury committed on her person .... She may
be a witness if he beats her, to protect herself from his future
brutality.'0 9
A spouse could testify when an attempt was made to commit violence
on the other by mailing poisoned candy.' 0
In a prosecution against the husband for violating the Mann Act
where the wife was the victim, she could testify against her husband
as the offense was a personal injury to her."' "In cases where the wife's
personal rights were concerned, the exceptions to the husband's priv-
ilege should be benevolently regarded."" 2 There was a single contrary
authority, 1 3 later overruled." 4 It makes no difference that there was
no coercion on the wife with respect to the offense."15
In 1914 a court held that a wife could not testify against her
husband for a crime against her, violation of the Mann Act, committed
before the marriage. 1 6 The court stated that it was following the law
of the state as it was in 1789. It made no difference that the rule might
encourage marriage to escape punishment. While there were no federal
precedents, the state precedents were in accord. But in 1944 a district
court allowed the wife to testify."
7
109 Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472, 539-577 (1851) (dissenting opinion).
See also United States v. Jones, 32 Fed. 569, 570 (D.D.C. 1887).
11o Kerr v. United States, 11 F.2d 227, 228 (9th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S.
689 (1926).
The cases permitting testimony where one spouse commits a crime on the other
are collected in 11 A.L.R.2d 646 (1950).
"'I Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 839 (Sth Cir. 1949); Levine v. United
States, 163 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1947); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1008
(2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944); Denning v. United States, 247 Fed.
463, 464 (5th Cir. 1918); Cohen v. United States, 214 Fed. 23, 29 (9th Cir. 1914);
Wilhoit v. Hiatt, supra note 80, at 665; United States v. Gwynne, 209 Fed. 993, 994
(E.D. Pa. 1914); United States v. Rispoli, 189 Fed. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1911).
112 United States v. Rispoli, supra note 111, at 273.
113 Johnson v. United States, 221 Fed. 250 (8th Cir. 1915). The trial court sus-
tained the privilege on claim of the wife in Lindsey v. United States, 227 F.2d 113, 115
(5th Cir. 1955).
114 Shores v. United States, supra note 114, at 839, noted 48 Mich. L. Rev. 546
(1950), 29 Neb. L. Rev. 108 (1949), 3 Okla. L. Rev. 225 (1950).
115 Shores v. United States, supra note 114, at 841.
116 United States v. Gwynne, supra note 111, at 994.
117 United States v. Williams, 55 F. Supp. 375, 379 (D. Minn. 1944).
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In 1959 the Supreme Court held that the defendant's wife could
not testify against her husband in a Mann Act prosecution where
the victim of the offense was not the wife." 8 The Government failed
in its effort to convince the Court that the privilege was only that
of the wife. It made no difference that the spouses were living apart
and never had lived together for any length of time.
Finally, in 1960, the Supreme Court, with three Justices dissenting,
held that a wife may testify against her husband in a Mann Act
prosecution where she is the victim."' The marriage apparently
occurred after the offense, but that was not treated as controlling.
The wife must testify even though unwilling. This was the first
Supreme Court decision to say that she must testify.2 The Court did
not say that the same rule would be applied to other offenses; each
case would be separately considered in the light of the reason which
has led to a refusal to recognize the defendant spouse's privilege.
It is surely a commentary on the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
abolish the anti-marital privilege that three members of the Court
dissented even in a Mann Act case where the wife was the victim of
the offense.
In a case arising in the then Territory of Hawaii, it was held that
a wife could testify that her husband induced and compelled her
to practice prostitution.121
A statute of 1906122 made a wife a competent witness against her
husband in abandonment cases in the District of Columbia. She could
testify in proceedings for removal in another district.123
The Supreme Court has stated: "Polygamy and adultery may be
crimes which involve disloyalty to the marital relation, but they are
rather crimes against such relation rather than against the wife."' 24
118 Hawkins v. United States, supra note 108, noted 45 Cornell L.Q. 131 (1959),
36 Dicta 255 (1959), 19 Fed. B.J. 85 (1959), 19 La. L. Rev. 527 (1959), 43 Marq. L.
Rev. 131 (1959), 5 N.Y.L.F. 311 (1959), 10 Syracuse L. Rev. 363 (1959), 32 Temp. L.Q.
351 (1959), 33 Tul. L. Rev. 884 (1959), 12 Vand. L. Rev. 947 (1959).
119 Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960), noted 13 Ala. L. Rev. 202 (1960),
10 De Paul L. Rev. 201 (1960), 49 Geo. L.J. 148 (1960), 23 Ga. B.J. 272 (1961), 74
Harv. L. Rev. 160 (1960), 45 Minn. L. Rev. 1077 (1961), 39 Texas L. Rev. 508 (1961),
109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 448 (1961), 14 Vand. L. Rev. 643 (1961), 18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
980 (1961).
120 But there was a similar holding in Shores v. United States, supra note 111, at
841.
121 Alford v. Territory, supra note 80, at 619.
122 34 Stat. 86 (1906).
123 Parker v. United States, 3 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1925).
124 Bassett v. United States, supra note 93. This was quoted favorably in Denning
v. United States, supra note 111, at 506.
[Vol. 24
HUSBAND-WIFE PRIVILEGES
But in 1958 the Supreme Court repudiated this view in a dictum. 5
As to offenses involving property of the spouse, there is a tendency
to hold that the spouse may testify. In forgery by one spouse of the
other's name, however, the victim spouse was not permitted to
testify.126 However, the facts in that case showed that the spouse
actually suffered no loss. On a prosecution for transporting in inter-
state commerce a sum of money feloniously converted from his wife,
the wife was permitted to testify.'2 7 An abandoned wife may testify
in a prosecution for forging her name. 23
In an early case the Supreme Court stated: "It has been said, that
on the grounds of state policy, the wife is a competent witness against
her husband in case of treason. . . . But it has since been settled,
that the wife is not bound to discover the treason of her husband."M 29
The Court also stated: "It is, however, admitted in all the cases, that
the wife is not competent, except in cases of violence upon her person,
directly to criminate her husband."
There is authority that even if the spouse was improperly allowed
to testify, it is not reversible error where the other evidence presented
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' 30 A court of appeals
offered this as an alternative ground for upholding a conviction in a
Mann Act prosecution where the wife was not the victim.131 But the
Supreme Court reversed after finding that it could not say "that her
testimony did not have substantial influence on the jury.'1132
In several cases federal courts have suggested an exception to
the privilege where the defendant's spouse is the only available
witness. 33 Wigmore has espoused this view. 34
125 Hawkins v. United States, supra note 108, at 78.
126 Paul v. United States, 79 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1935).
127 United States v. Graham, 87 F. Supp. 237, 238 (E.D. Mich. 1949), noted 48
Mich. L. Rev. 1223 (1950); Herman v. United States, 220 F.2d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 1955).
But where the prosecution was of other victims, although the wife had been an
earlier victim, the wife could not testify. United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.
1949). Judge Clark, dissenting, would allow her to testify even then.
123 United States v. Ryno, 130 F. Supp. 685, 688 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d
581 (9th Cir. 1956), noted 41 Va. L. Rev. 822 (1955).
129 Stein v. Bowman, supra note 108, at 222. See 8 Wigmore § 2239.
130 Ryno v. United States, supra note 128, at 584. But the holding is weak as the
trial was by the court, and the spouse had been abandoned and a property loss was
inflicted on her.
131 Hawkins v. United States, 249 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 358 U.S.
74 (1958).
132 Hawkins v. United States, supra note 108, at 79.
133 United States v. Williams, supra note 117; United States v. Graham, supra
note 127, at 238-41; Eisenberg v. United States, 273 F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir. 1959).
'34 8 Wigmore § 2239. See Note, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 1077, 1088 (1961).
1963]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
A wife may testify against her husband at the preliminary ex-
amination in a prosecution under the Mann Act where the wife is the
victim, at least where her testimony is admitted with her consent and
that of her husband.135 Prior to the Federal Criminal Rules, state law
did not apply to the qualifications of witnesses at the preliminary
examination. However, the existing state law happened to be the same.
The case is narrow in scope, since the wife could also testify at the
trial. It is not necessarily authority that the wife could testify where she
could not also testify at the trial.
A federal court cited favorably a New York state case holding
that an indictment should be quashed where defendant's wife was
called as a witness against him by the grand jury, as this was sub-
stantial error and it was doubtful whether an indictment would have
been found without the wife's testimony. 136 A federal statute of
1887 17 made a spouse a competent witness to testify before a grand
jury as to polygamy, but the spouse could not be compelled to
testify without the consent of the other spouse. In 1927 a court stated:
We are of the opinion that the testimony of a wife before the grandjury resulting in the indictment of her husband and plaintiffs in
error for the commission of a crime was incompetent at the time
it was given, and a subsequent plea of guilty of the husband can-
not render the testimony competent which was incompetent when
given. 188
In 1951 the Supreme Court held that a husband could claim the
privilege as to marital communications as to his wife's whereabouts
at a grand jury hearing.139 The husband did not make a claim not to
testify against his spouse under the anti-marital privilege. In 1936 a
court held that compelling a spouse to testify before the grand jury
would not be considered on habeas corpus.140 In 1955 it was held that
a wife could testify before the grand jury when the offense was an
injury to her property rights.14' The court did not pass on the question
whether the spouse could appear in any case irrespective of injury
to her through the offense. It should be noted that in 1958 the Supreme
Court stated: "Adverse testimony given in criminal proceedings
135 Cohen v. United States, supra note 111, at 27.
136 United States v. Farrington, 5 Fed. 343, 348 (N.D.N.Y. 1881).
137 24 Stat. 635 (1887).
138 Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1927).
139 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951). Two dissenting Justices
thought the communication not privileged because not confidential and would punish
the witness for contempt.
140 Thouvenell v. Zerbst, 83 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1936).
141 Herman v. United States, supra note 127, at 226.
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would, we think, be likely to destroy almost any marriage."' 42 The
concept "criminal proceeding" is rather broad. A court has stated
that it includes "all possible steps in the criminal case from its inception
to judgment and sentence."' 43 On the other hand, a motion to suppress
will not lie as to statements obtained from a wife by Internal Revenue
Agents after interrogation.'44
8. Whose Is the Privilege
In most states not only is the party-spouse privileged to keep the
spouse-witness off the stand, but the latter has a privilege also to refuse
to testify against the party though he consents. 4 In 1943 the Second
Circuit stated in dictum that "clearly the better view is that the
privilege is that of either spouse who chooses to claim it."'46 The
privilege of excluding adverse testimony is generally regarded as
belonging to both spouses. A defendant may assert the privilege in
order to prevent his spouse from testifying, and a witness may decline
to testify against the accused spouse.147 But in one case there was a
strong dictum that the wife can be compelled to testify against her
husband whenever an exception to his privilege exists.' 4 This view
was followed in a subsequent case,'149 but the Supreme Court did not
fully accept it.'10 A husband or wife "cannot be compelled to testify
against his or her spouse and cannot be permitted to do so unless the
other spouse consents."'8 ' It makes no difference that the witness-
142 Hawkins v. United States, supra note 108, at 77.
143 United States v. Choate, 276 F.2d 724, 727 n.6 (5th Cir. 1960). See Orfield,
"The Scope of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," 38 U. Det. L.J. 173, 188-189
(1960).
144 United States v. Winfree, supra note 97, at 660.
145 McCormick § 66 n.3; 8 Wigmore § 2241.
146 United States v. Mitchell, supra note 111, at 1008. The court cited 8 Wigmore
§ 2241.
See Note, 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 208, 219-220 (1961). The privilege of the spouse not
to testify is that of the two spouses and not of third persons, such as co-defendants.
Knoell v. United States, supra note 99, at 23. But cf. Paul v. United States, supra note
126, at 563.
147 Wyatt v. United States, supra note 119, at 529; Hawkins v. United States,
supra note 108, at 77; Jackson v. United States, 250 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1958);
Lindsey v. United States, 217 F.2d 113, 115 (Sth Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
1008 (1956) ; United States v. Mitchell, supra note 111, at 1008; Cohen v. United States,
supra note 111, at 29.
148 Shores v. United States, supra note 111, at 841.
149 Wyatt v. United States, 263 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1959), at'd, 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
150 Wyatt v. United States, supra note 119, at 529. She could be made to testify in
a Mann Act prosecution where she is the victim.
151 Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 1954).
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spouse is willing to testify. The Supreme Court has stated that none
of its decisions supports a distinction between compelled and voluntary
testimony. 52 Justice Stewart concurred in the result because the
evidence did hot clearly show that the witness-spouse testified vol-
untarily. 5 3 He conceded that it would often be difficult to distinguish
between voluntary and compelled testimony.
9. Waiver
Where the wife of the defendant testified for the Government,
but objection to the competency was made after the witness left the
stand and after several other witnesses had been subsequently examined,
the objection came too late.'54 At common law, an objection to the
competency of a witness on the ground of interest was required to be
made before his examination in chief or, if his interest was not then
known, as soon as it was discovered. The trial judge is not required
to enforce the privilege of his own motion." 5
There may be waiver by express consent to the spouse's testi-
mony.15 6 In one case the husband testified at the trial revealing
incriminating facts. His wife took the stand to corroborate his testi-
mony. On appeal, his objection that the court erred in admitting her
testimony was overruled.1 7 Where no objection is raised in the trial
court there is a waiver.'5 But it has been held that a specific objection
is not required; it is enough that the absence of the defendant's con-
sent is suggested to the court. 9
10. Comment on Exercise of Privilege
Suppose there is a valid claim of privilege. May the Government
comment upon its invocation? Most American cases hold that there
may be no comment. 6" The few federal cases on the point are in
152 Hawkins v. United States, supra note 108, at 77.
153 Id. at 81-82.
'54 Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 331 (1892).
The wife testified, as to six slips and two letters, that they were in the handwriting
of the defendant, and that the letters were received by her through the mail.
In accord, see United States v. Knoell, 230 Fed. 509, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1916), aff'd,
Knoell v. United States, 239 Fed. 16, 22 (3d Cir. 1917), error dismissed, 246 U.S. 648
(1918).
155 United States v. Knoell, supra note 154, at 23.
16 Griffin v. United States, 336 US. 704, 714 (1949).
157 United States v. Levy, 153 F.2d 995, 997 (3d Cir. 1946).
158 Olender v. United States, supra note 151, at 800.
159 Jackson v. United States, supra note 147, at 900. While the court cited Wigmore,
the present edition seems contra. See 8 Wigmore § 2242.
160 See Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 928-933 and 8 Wigmore § 2243 n.1. There may be no
comment in England. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law § 632 (17th ed. 1958).
[Vol. 24
HUSBAND-WIFE PRIVILEGES
conflict. An early decision of the Supreme Court seemed to hold that
there may be no comment. A woman was present with the murderer.
The defendant did not have his wife in court so that it could be
determined whether she was the woman, and the husband thus identi-
fied. The Supreme Court held that no comment could be made by the
Government and offered two reasons: first, that the defendant was
not bound to anticipate the need, and second, because she was not
competent to testify in his favor. 6' But in a prosecution for robbery,
the defendant's failure to call his wife who had material knowledge
was held open to inference. 62 The opinion was by Learned Hand.
The facts do not reveal that there was comment by the Government
or by the trial judge. It is an established principle that there may be
an inference from the suppression of available testimony or from
the failure to utilize it.163 But most cases in the state courts hold that
this principle is inconsistent with the marital privilege and must yield
to it.114 After all, the purpose of the privilege is to deny the Govern-
ment the use of the spouse's testimony against her husband. It there-
fore seems undesirable to allow comment by the Government or by
the court on the consequent inference the jury will draw. They are
likely to draw an inference against the defendant even if there is no
comment. It should be recalled that when a wife could not testify for
her husband, a court of appeals held that the jury should be instructed
on request that she cannot testify where the facts are such that the
jury might otherwise draw unfavorable inferences from her failure to
testify.' 3 But the Government should have the right to call the spouse
to the stand and force the claim of privilege. It is possible that the
privilege will be waived if the testimony is called for.
11. Conclusion
In the opinion of the author of this article, the federal courts should
move more speedily in the direction of permitting a spouse to testify
161 Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 120 (1893). Mr. Justice Brewer dissented.
162 United States v. Fox, 97 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1938). The court cited Wigmore
§ 2273. In Dayton v. United States, 152 F.2d 402, 403 (9th Cir. 1945), the Government
was allowed to comment on the failure of the defendant's common-law wife to take the
stand to support the defendant.
In Bisno v. United States, 299 F.2d 711, 720-722 (9th Cir. 1961), the court allowed
the Government to comment on the defendant's failure to call his wife and denied the
defendant an instruction against drawing inferences from the failure of the defendant's
wife to testify. A concurring judge disagreed on this point, but found it harmless error.
163 2 Wigmore § 286; McCormick § 249. As to instructions, see Annot., 131 A.L.R.
702 (1941).
164 8 Wigmore § 2243.
165 Fisher v. United States, 32 F.2d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1929).
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against the other spouse in all criminal cases. In the words of Justice
Stewart:
Any rule that impedes the discovery of truth in a court of law
impedes as well the doing of justice. When such a rule is the prod-
uct of a conceptualism long ago discarded, is universally criticized
by scholars, and has been qualified or abandoned in many juris-
dictions, it should receive the most careful scrutiny. Surely "reason
and experience" require that we do more than indulge in mere
assumptions, perhaps naive assumptions, as to the importance of
this ancient rule to the interests of domestic tranquility.166
III. THE PRIVILEGE FOR MARITAL COMMYrUNICATIONS
1. History
The Supreme Court stated in 1839: "It is, however, admitted
in all the cases that the wife is not competent, except in cases of vio-
lence upon her person to criminate her husband, or to disclose that
which she has learned from him in their confidential intercourse."' 67
In a civil case the Supreme Court stated that "suits cannot be main-
tained which could require a disclosure of the confidences . . . be-
tween husband and wife."1 " While a statute of 1887169 made a
spouse competent to testify as to polygamy, it was provided that
"such witness shall not be permitted to testify as to any statement
or communication made by either husband or wife to each other, during
the existence of the marriage relation, deemed confidential at common
law."
2. Policy of the Privilege
One judge has stated:
The wise public policy, which forbids a husband or wife to testify
as to confidential communications, is intended, by preserving such
confidences from disclosure, to preserve unshattered the sacredness
and integrity of the marriage relation, which is so vital to the
stability of our civilization. The thought is that married people
shall be made safe in their communications to each other by the
assurance that neither will be permitted to violate such confidences.
It is essential and solely for the benefit of the parties involved,
and serves no further useful purpose.170
166 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81-82 (1958).
That most scholars reject the anti-marital privilege, see Note, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 884,
890 n.63 (1959), citing authorities.
167 Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 222 (1839).
See Annot., 95 L. Ed. 309 (1951) on the whole topic; and as to history, see 8
Wigmore § 2333; McCormick § 82.
168 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876).
169 24 Stat. 635 (1887).
170 Adams v. United States, 259 F.2d 214, 215 (8th Cir. 1919). See 8 Wigmore
§ 2332; McCormick § 90.
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The Supreme Court has stated that protection of the marriage rela-
tion is the basis of the rule.17' At the same time, the Court indicated
the modern policy behind the privilege: "The privilege suppresses
relevant testimony, and should be allowed only when it is plain that
marital confidence cannot *otherwise reasonably be preserved."' 12
In 1935 a court pointed out: "The wisdom of the common-law rules
that held inviolate the confidence of a . . . husband in his wife, has
stood the test of time. The statutes of forty-two jurisdictions provide
that private communications between husband and wife are incom-
petent evidence, and in twenty-six of these it is expressly provided
that they are-incompetent during the marriage and afterwards. Such
is the rule in the federal courts."' 73
3. Anti-Marital Privilege Distinguished
The privilege covering confidential communications between
husband and wife exists independently of the rule disqualifying one
spouse from testifying for or against the other spouse.' 74 While talk
of the privilege goes back to 1839, there was very little use of it in
early years because of the rule that a spouse was privileged not to
testify at all against her spouse except in rare situations. A federal
court willing to remove the bar as to anti-marital facts admitted that
different considerations applied to marital communications. 5
4. Privilege Applicable to Marital Status Only
Communications between husband and wife before marriage are
not privileged,'176 nor are communications after their divorce.1
77
5. Confidentiality
The communication must be confidential. The admission of the
testimony of the divorced wife of the defendant as to the contents of
a lost paper, which had been handed to her by the defendant while
she was still his wife during a consultation between them and others
relating to matters out of which the prosecution arose, was not rever-
171 Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
172 See McCormick § 90.
173 Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665, 668 (10th Cir. 1935).
174 Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342, 349 (1897); Wolfle v. United States, supra
note 171, at 14. See 8 Wigmore § 2334; McCormick § 66.
175 Yoder v. United States, supra note 173, at 668.
176 Halback v. Hill, 261 Fed. 1007, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1919) (habeas corpus to obtain
child); Yoder v. United States, supra note 175, at 668; United States v. Mitchell, 137
F.2d 1006, 1009 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944). See McCormick § 85;
8 Wigmore § 2335.
177 Yoder v. United States, supra note 173.
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sible error where it did not appear from the record that the com-
munication was confidential, or that the paper was not read by the
others present.17 If the communication is only between a spouse and
a third person, there is no privilege. 7 9 A court has stated that the
privilege as to marital communications "has not been applied to any
matter which the husband, for example, has elected to make public
by saying it in the presence of third persons along with his wife."'80
The Supreme Court has stated that "when made in the presence of
a third party, such communications are usually regarded as not
privileged because not made in confidence."'' But in some cases
they may be confidential. There is no privilege as to threats against
the wife in the presence of others.'82 In a civil case the Supreme
Court held that a communication was confidential even though it was
in the presence of a young daughter who took no part in it.183 But
in a criminal case the Supreme Court referred favorably to the rule
that communications "voluntarily made in the presence of their
children, old enough to comprehend them, or other members of the
family circle, are not privileged."' 18 4
Where the husband left a note for the wife at their home, written
on a large cardboard, the message was held not confidential. 18 5 A
letter from the defendant to his wife, dictated by him to a stenographer,
is not privileged. The Supreme Court stated by Mr. Justice Stone:
"Normally husband and wife may conveniently communicate without
stenographic aid, and the privilege of holding their confidences immune
from proof in court may be reasonably enjoyed and preserved without
embracing within it the testimony of third persons to whom such com-
munications have been voluntarily revealed."'8 6 The intent of the
writer of the letter not to consider the communication confidential was
not the basis of the decision. Instead it was that the communication
178 Jacobs v. United States, 161 Fed. 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1908). The court cited
two civil cases. Stein v. Bowman, supra note 167, at 222; Hopkins v. Grimshaw, supra
note 174, at 349. See 8 Wigmore § 2336; McCormick § 84.
179 United States v. Gonella, 103 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1939); Tabbah v. United States,
217 F.2d 528, 529 (5th Cir. 1954).
180 United States v. Guiteau, 12 D.C. (1 Mackey) 498, 548 (1882). See also
United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276, 280 (6th Cir. 1952).
181 Wolfle v. United States, supra note 171, at 14.
182 United States v. Mitchell, supra note 176, at 1009.
183 Hopkins v. Grimshaw, supra note 174, at 351.
184 Wolfle v. United States, supra note 171, at 17.
185 Yoder v. United States, supra note 173, at 668.
186 Wolfle v. United States, supra note 171, at 16, noted 22 Calif. L. Rev. 573
(1935), 22 Geo. L.J. 623 (1934), 10 Ind. L.J. 182 (1934), 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. 644 (1934),
9 Wis. L. Rev. 426 (1934).
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was not within the privilege because of its voluntary disclosure to a
third person.
Where communications between spouses are in private, they are
assumed to be confidential unless the subject of the communication or
the circumstances indicate the contrary.8 7 The presumption may be
overcome by proof that it was not intended to be private, or the pres-
ence of a third party, or the intention that the information be trans-
mitted to a third person.1 18 Testimony may be given by either spouse
as to the known presence of a third person.'89
6. Nature and Scope of Communication
On a prosecution for transporting a wife in interstate commerce
for purposes of prostitution, it was held that the wife's testimony as
to the act of the husband in taking money from her was not priv-
ileged.' In 1954 the Supreme Court stated "the privilege, generally,
extends only to utterances, and not to acts."'191 A communication
between a spouse and a third person is an act and not privileged.192
A divorced wife may testify that the defendant was not living with
her to prove draft evasion by false statements that the defendant was
living with his wife. 93 The former wife's testimony dealt with her
residence with her parents and the membership of their household.
The privilege does not apply to testimony by a wife as to the conduct
of her husband before annulment of the marriage. 94 There can be
no claim of marital privilege as to records of the husband turned over
by the estranged wife to the Internal Revenue Service as they are not
a marital communication between spouses, and are not confidential
between them.195 A motion to suppress will not be granted as to in-
formation obtained by Internal Revenue agents from their interroga-
tion of the wife of the defendant.19 6
The privilege protects against indirect disclosure of the com-
187 Blau v. United States, supra note 139, at 333.
188 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); Picciurro v. United States, 250
F.2d 585, 589 (8th Cir. 1958).
189 Ibid.
190 United States v. Mitchell, supra note 176, at 1009. See 8 Wigmore § 2237;
McCormick § 83; Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1389 (1950).
191 Pereira v. United States, supra note 188, at 6. The court cited 8 Wigmore
§ 2337. But cf. Note, 47 J. Crim. L. 205 (1956); Annot., 10 AJL.R.2d 1389 (1950).
192 Pool v. United States, 260 F.2d 57, 64 (9th Cir. 1958); Tabbah v. United
States, 217 F.2d 528, 529 (5th Cir. 1955).
193 United States v. Termini, 267 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1959).
194 Cooper v. United States, 282 F.2d 527, 533 (9th Cir. 1960).
395 United States v. Ashby, 245 F.2d 527, 533 (9th Cir. 1957).
106 United States v. Winfree, 170 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
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munication. Where a husband is asked where his wife now is, he need
not disclose this fact when he learned it solely from her secret com-
munication.197 The wife was hiding out to avoid Government process.
Thus, the privilege possibly extends to future or continuing criminal
conduct.
A divorced wife may testify that she saw no indications of in-
sanity during her marriage with the defendant. The court stated:
"We think that the exhibition of sanity or insanity is not a
communication at all, in the sense of the rule which protects
the privacy and confidence of the marriage relation, any more than
the height or color, or blindness, or the loss of an arm of one of the
parties is a communication."'98 The communicator has no choice. Yet
there was communication in the sense that the wife became aware of
his condition. The interest of preserving confidence is served by
protecting the communication of one unable to help himself and also
unable to conceal because of the close relationship of marriage. A
number of state courts give a privilege as to acts performed with the
intent to convey information, the intent being implied from the pro-
pinquity of the marital relation. 199
7. Exceptions
In a leading case, Chief Judge Learned Hand stated: "We do
not forget that a wife from the earliest times was competent to
testify against her husband, when the crime was an offense against
her person .... The same exception probably extends to the privilege
against the admission of confidential communications.""' But this
view was not followed in a case involving abandonment and property
injury 01
A federal civil case has suggested that there be applied to marital
communications the rule applied in cases of confidences between
attorney and client that a communication made for the purpose of
effecting a fraud or crime is not privileged. 202 The Uniform Rules of
'97 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951). Two Justices dissented.
The lower court had denied the privilege. Rogers v. United States, 179 F.2d 559,
564 (10th Cir. 1950).
198 United States v. Guiteau, supra note 180, at 547. See Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1389,
1401 (1950).
199 See Note, 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 208, 221-222 (1961) ; McCormick § 83.
200 United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1949). See McCormick
§ 88; 8 Wigmore § 2338; Note, 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 208, 227 (1961).
201 United States v. Ryno, 130 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d
581 (9th Cir. 1956).
202 Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139, 143 (6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 842 (1945). Such an approach is advocated in McCormick § 83.
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Evidence so provide in Rule 28(2). But possibly the Supreme Court
has indicated otherwise20
The privilege may be invoked at a grand jury proceeding,20 4
as well as at the trial. A statute of 1887205 provided that a spouse
need not testify before the grand jury in a bigamy prosecution as
to marital communications. In this respect the rule may be different
from the privilege for anti-marital facts.
An objection that the question was incompetent and called for
hearsay does not raise an objection that it called for confidential
communications between husband and wifeY00 An appellate court will
not consider the issue of privileged communication if it is not properly
raised in the trial court.
8. Documents Obtained by Third Persons
Suppose the spouse to whom a letter is addressed dies, and the
letter is found among the effects of the deceased. May the personal
representative be required or permitted to produce it in court? In
this situation there is no betrayal or connivance by the deceased spouse.
Furthermore this is not a disclosure against which the sender could
take precautions. Since most courts hold the privilege survives the death
of a spouse, the privilege should be upheld."0 But a federal court
held, on the trial of a husband for the murder of his wife, that a letter
to his wife found by a third person among her effects was admissible.
"The letter, having come into the hands of the prosecution through a
third party, thereby lost its privileged character.1208 Yet there are civil
cases giving protection. 9
203 Blau v. United States, supra note 197. See Morgan, Maguire, and Weinstein,
Cases and Materials on Evidence, 839 n.11 (4th ed. 1957).
204 Blau v. United States, supra note 197, at 333. Two Justices dissented because
they thought the communication was not confidential.
205 24 Stat. 635 (1887).
200 Proffitt v. United States, 264 Fed. 299, 302 (9th Cir. 1920).
207 McCormick § 86; 8 Wigmore § 2339.
208 Dickerson v. United States, 65 F.2d 824, 827 (1st Cir. 1933). The court cited
Halback v. Hill, 261 Fed. 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1919), but there the letters were written
prior to the marriage. The court also cited Bassett v. United States, 137 U.S. 496
(1890), but that case held the spouse incompetent to testify; letters and death of a
spouse were not involved.
209 Bowman v. Patrick, 32 Fed. 368 (E.D. Nev. 1887); New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Ross, 30 F.2d 80, 81 (6th Cir. 1928). These cases were cited in Wolfle v. United
States, supra note 171, at 13, not, however, involving the precise point, and the Court
left open the point whether third persons may testify.
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9. Holder of the Privilege
A federal civil case has suggested that the communicating spouse
is the holder of the privilege." This is the view of writers on evi-
dence."1' A single federal criminal case, however, held that the
privilege was that of both spouses, but the testimony was admissible
if either one waived. 12
10. Waiver
A failure of the holder to assert the privilege by objection, or a
voluntary revelation by such holder on the stand, may be a waiver.
A federal civil case has gone even further and held that when the
husband claims the privilege on the stand, but answers when the court
orders, this is a waiver.21 The remedy of the witness was to stand on
his claim of privilege, subject himself to contempt proceedings, and
then take an appeal or apply for habeas corpus.
11. Death
A federal civil case held that the death of the communicating
spouse did not terminate the privilege. 14 Another federal criminal case
did not pass on the precise point, but held that a letter to a deceased
wife, having come into the hands of the Government through a third
party, thereby lost its privileged character 1
12. Divorce
May a divorced wife testify as to a confidential communication?
One court found it unnecessary to decide the point, as it con-
cluded that the communication was not confidential.2 16 Another court
stated that she may not testify.217 In 1954 the Supreme Court
accepted Wigmore's view that divorce does not terminate the priv-
210 Fraser v. United States, supra note 202, at 144. See also Stickney v. Stickney,
131 U.S. 227, 237 (1888).
211 8 Wigmore § 2340(1); McCormick § 87.
212 United States v. Mitchell, supra note 176, at 1008. The court cited 8 Wigmore
§ 2241 (3d ed. 1940) which, however, deals with the anti-marital privilege.
213 Fraser v. United States, supra note 202, at 144. It has been concluded that this
is questionable. McCormick § 87.
For a criminal case finding a waiver because of a failure to object properly, see
Proffitt v. United States, supra note 206, at 302.
214 Brooks v. Francis, 10 D.C. (3 McArthur) 109, 112 (1879). See also Stein v.
Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 223 (1839); McCormick § 89; 8 Wigmore §2341.
215 Dickerson v. United States, supra note 208, at 827. See McCormick § 86.
216 United States v. Gonella, supra note 179.
217 United States v. Walker, supra note 200, at 567. The court cited 8 Wigmore
§ 2341(2) (3d ed. 1940). See also McCormick § 89.
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ilege.2 18 In this respect the privilege differs from the anti-marital
privilege. The Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 28 (1), limit the
confidential communication privilege "during the marital relationship.,'
CONCLUSION
The federal courts should retain the privilege for confidential
communications. The federal courts should make it clear that there
is no such privilege where the offense is against the person or property
of the other spouse. There should be no privilege where the communica-
tion was intended to enable or aid any person to commit or plan
to commit a crime or a tort. The concept of "communication" should
be broad enough to cover not only verbal exchanges and acts performed
with manifest intent to convey information, but also acts performed
with the intent to convey information where such intent is implied from
the propinquity of the marriage relation. Aside from this, the scope
of the privilege should be strictly limited. The courts should move in
the direction of a rule that the privilege is a qualified one which must
yield if the trial court finds that the evidence of the communication
is required in the due administration of justice.
2i8 Pereira v. United States, supra note 188, at 6.
Perhaps an annulment does not terminate the privilege either. Cooper v. United
States, 282 F.2d 527, 533 (9th Cir. 1960).
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